Introduction
The attached visual illustrates the impressive nature of America's 21 st 
Figure 1. Air Force Distributed ISR Architecture
What is seldom understood is that the RPA front and DCGS back-end components of this technological marvel do not operate as an integrated crew. Its members do not plan, debrief or discuss the mission together. In fact, the members rarely know one another. Moreover, the 
Operational Context
The requirements for ISR support have exploded over the last 15 years. During the 1990s-era Balkan campaigns, the AF typically manned one RQ- Yet by rethinking how GE conducted its core business functions, focusing efforts on eliminating boundaries between GE's divisions, and building a teamwork approach to all operations, he transformed the company. 14 When he retired in 2001, GE's market capitalization had increased from $13B to $490B including a minimum of 12% growth each year.
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Front-End, Back-End Limitations
To appreciate the full lack of integration between RPA and DCGS units, it is necessary to understand the fielding and employment of these weapon systems. To be fair, teaming relationships do occur between RPA and DCGS crews on an ad hoc though infrequent basis.
Additionally, the lack of integration is not the fault of crews on either end as they are great Airmen dedicated to their mission and working within designed mission constraints. However, the root cause of the lack of integration is the Air Force's traditional view of weapon systems that treats front and back-ends as distinct and separate components. 
Mode of Operations -Shortfalls:
Nodes Operate as Separate Crews: In a JSTARS, the pilots and navigators are not regarded as a separate crew from the back-end air battle managers and intelligence specialists.
They function as a single crew and accomplishing the mission is their combined responsibility. 
Crew Communication Mechanisms -Progress:
Another advancement initiated in the wake of the Uruzgan incident investigation is ACC's four-phase measured approach to install voice communication links between MQ-1/9 and DCGS units. The plan is a proof-of-concept and if successful, training and force-wide fielding will follow. 35 This measured start will improve coordination and will eventually be extended to RQ-4 units as well. Still, this advancement is complicated by the multi-MAJCOM nature of this initiative.
Weapon System Ownership -Shortfalls:
For RIVET JOINT, the aircraft, sensors, maintenance, pilots, navigators and tactical coordinators are ACC assets whereas oversight and resourcing of back-end intelligence crew and squadrons is provided by Air Force Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance Agency (AFISRA), which reports to the AF/A2. 36 However, all personnel are OPCON to the 55 th Wing (ACC). At the Wing-level and below, all aircrew complete joint training together and share the same weapon system documentation. This was not always the case as the front and back-end units previously reported to separate wings, trained differently, and had unique documentation. 40 Eventually, both front and back-end elements were collocated in the HAF/A2 and programs fell under the Space and C4ISR panel which has served to improve integration. However, much of the operational efforts along with the support of platforms, sensors and personnel belong at the MAJCOM level where several headquarters own pieces of the distributed ISR system.
Operational Documentation -Shortfalls:
A further consequence of this ownership conundrum is a lack of overarching documentation. Currently, no CONOPs document exists that describes how the front and backend elements should operate together. The "the use of imprecise non-standard terms" during the Uruzgan incident demonstrated the potential for mission failure when there are no integrating publications. As the Uruzgan incident underscored, it is unrealistic to assume virtual crews will perform like HPTs if overarching guidance does not exist to delineate crew responsibilities, define procedures or provide a comprehensive process for improving tactics, techniques and procedures. While each weapon system does consider the others in its documentation, only limited attention is given to the respective front or back-end elements. The myopic nature of current weapon system documentation perpetuates a non-integrated approach to front-end/backend distributed ISR operations.
Integrated Crew Training -Shortfalls:
A final structural limitation to an integrated crew concept is the training system that prepares RPA and DCGS Airmen for ISR operations. In a RIVET JOINT aircraft, front and back-end crew members now train together though they are owned by separate MAJCOMs. 42 Clearly, integrated training is facilitated by collocation.
Because the current distributed ISR paradigm is based on a bifurcated weapon system approach, no mutual training exists. Though each weapon system does recognize the others in their mission qualification syllabi, they do not conduct combined training. Each weapon system has its own Formal Training Unit located at different bases and owned by different MAJCOMs.
There are no shared academic blocks of instruction that could be conducted for both RPA and Inter-Weapon System Documentation: The Air Staff should appoint a lead MAJCOM to develop overarching MDS documentation and TTP manuals and provide the appropriate subject matter experts to carry this out. In the interim, the simplest course of action is to add addendums to already existing MDS documents that more clearly delineate the roles and functions of virtual crew members as well as joint TTPs that should be executed. Such a step would provide tremendous fidelity to the myopic perspective current documents offer.
Integrated Training: The PAD should prescribe development of integrated training syllabi. While mission qualification training is currently conducted separately, the PAD should appoint a lead MAJCOM to identify training requirements. Integrated training will facilitate confidence building and increase crew cooperation. It also enhances overall operational capability.
Procurement Guidance: The PAD should also direct an integrated approach for future weapon system spirals and new acquisition programs. Post acquisition integration efforts are expensive and operationally inefficient. Program Manager and Program Element Monitors must be geared to procure and support integrated weapon systems.
Unity of Command:
Resolving the distributed ISR Unity of Command challenge is hindered significantly by multi-MAJCOM ownership of ISR. USSOCOM was created by Congress to provide Unity of Command for multi-service SOF following Operation EAGLE CLAW. The Air Force must do the same for its ISR forces. As the Director of the Air Staff RPA Task Force explained "ISR is the only core function whose effects lie in multiple MAJCOMs." 46 While a PAD could provide the overarching framework to solve current front and back-end distributed ISR challenges, sustained progress will be difficult while such elements lie in multiple MAJCOMs.
Conclusion
Over the past 15 years, the Air Force has fielded an incredible distributed ISR network; demands for this capability continue to rise. This system has yielded numerous operational successes that underscore the professionalism of the ISR operators who operate these platforms, sensors, communications links, and exploitation equipment. However, the operational effectiveness of RPA and DCGS elements is limited because they operate more as independent nodes than as an integrated team. Though a network was established to link these nodes, a framework to optimize their employment was not. This great limitation requires a PAD and organization changes to remedy the current bifurcated front and back-end system.
By taking these actions, the Air Force can achieve the implied synergy of its distributed ISR system that was depicted in figure 1 . Its distributed ISR operations will become even more effective than the impressive missions it executes today.
